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We derive conditions such that optimal liquidity provisions through a demand
deposit scheme can be sustainably implemented in a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium under the assumption that renegade investors have free access to ex-post
asset markets. As our qualitative main ￿nding we demonstrate that such sus-
tainability is more likely for ￿poor￿than for ￿rich￿scheme participants in terms
of future income. By establishing sustainability for low future income popula-
tions, our formal analysis therefore o⁄ers an important quali￿cation of Jacklin￿ s
(1987) in￿ uential claim that an optimal demand deposit scheme is not sustainable
whenever there exists the possibility of an ex-post asset market.
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11 Introduction
In the wake of the recent global ￿nancial markets crisis￿ and the even more recent EU
debt crisis￿ there exists renewed interest in understanding better the welfare implica-
tions of ￿nancial intermediaries and asset markets. Popular opinion has it these days
that asset markets and ￿nancial intermediaries, i.e., banks, are doing more harm than
good to a society￿ s overall welfare. In contrast, economic theory claims that ￿nancial
intermediaries and asset-markets are welfare-improving because their existence allows
for the mitigation of all kinds of risks. As a consequence of these risk-mitigation e⁄ects
risk-averse investors become encouraged to invest in risky￿ but in average pro￿table￿
projects which would not become reality otherwise. Quite surprisingly though, beyond
this standard insurance argument the theoretical literature o⁄ers very little in terms of
conclusive results about welfare implications of di⁄erent ￿nancial arrangements such as
￿nancial intermediaries, on the one hand, and asset markets, on the other hand.
The focus of this paper is on the question whether ￿nancial intermediaries can achieve
welfare maximization when they coexist with asset markets. More speci￿cally, we investi-
gate conditions such that ￿nancial intermediation in the form of a demand deposit scheme
can sustainably implement optimal liquidity allocations if there is the possibility of an
ex-post asset market. Recall that in a demand deposit scheme economic agents pool their
￿nancial resources through a ￿nancial intermediary (i.e., the ￿bank￿ ) who invests them
in a project and pays a contracted stream of interest to the agents. Bryant (1980) and
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) describe situations in which a demand deposit scheme can
implement a welfare maximizing liquidity allocation that is not implementable through
an ex-ante asset market. Moreover, Wallace (1988, 1990) demonstrates the formal equiv-
alence of the ￿ good￿equilibrium in the Diamond and Dybvig model, on the one hand,
and the allocation achievable by welfare maximization under asymmetric information,
on the other hand. Initiated by Jacklin￿ s (1987) highly in￿ uential article, however, the
relevance of this welfare advantage of demand deposits over asset markets has subse-
quently come under heavy scrutiny (cf., e.g., Haubrich 1988, Haubrich and King 1999,
Jacklin 1993, von Thadden 1997, 1998, 1999, Wallace 1988, 1990, chapter 12.2.4 in Ti-
role 2006). As a consequence of the so-called ￿ Jacklin critique￿there now appears to be
a common perception in the literature that a demand deposit scheme could only outper-
form asset markets under the￿ rather unrealistic assumption￿ that there exist severe
trading restrictions on ex-post asset markets.1
1The perception that demand deposits cannot improve welfare over market-based solutions in realistic
sitiations also gives rise to the popular opinion that asset markets may perform better from an overall
perspective since they are not vulnerable to bank runs, (cf., e.g., the textbook treatments in Bolton and
Dewatripont 2005, and in Freixas and Rochet 2008). Indeed, Diamond and Dybvig￿ s (1983) seminal
2More precisely, Jacklin (1987) argues that the demand deposit scheme cannot sustain-
ably implement the optimal liquidity allocation if there is the possibility of an ex-post
asset market. Jacklin￿ s￿ rather informal￿ argument considers a renegade agent who
does not join the demand deposit scheme but rather privately invests in the project.
In case this agent turns out to have a high desire for liquidity, he would then later-on
sell the corresponding asset on the ex-post market to scheme participants. According
to Jacklin, such renegade agent could always achieve an asset-price that is su¢ ciently
high to give him a strict incentive for not joining the demand deposit scheme provided
that all other agents join this scheme. Technically speaking, according to the ￿ Jacklin
critique￿a second-best liquidity allocation through a demand deposit scheme is thus not
implementable in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium whenever agents have the outside
option of making private investments which they can sell later-on on some ex-post asset
market.
We formally investigate the validness of this claim by considering a large population
of ex-ante identical agents who face a portfolio maximization problem whereby each
agent decides about how much of his initial wealth to invest in an illiquid long-term
project or to hold as money, respectively. We further assume that each agent￿ s future
desire for liquidity is private knowledge whereby the fraction of liquidity types in the
population is known. In contrast to the standard insurance argument in favor of ￿nancial
intermediation, we establish welfare bene￿ts for the demand deposit scheme in a com-
pletely risk-neutral environment so that insurance considerations do not matter.2 As an
intermediate result of our analysis (Proposition 3) we obtain that the welfare maximizing
liquidity allocation can be sustainably implemented through a demand deposit scheme
if and only if a prospective renegade agent can only expect a rather low asset-price on
the ex-post asset market. In a next step we formally link this asset price to the renegade
agent￿ s market power on the ex-post asset market (Proposition 4). As our qualitative
main insight we proceed to argue that the structure of the agents￿intertemporal income
streams has a crucial impact on the renegade agent￿ s market power and thereby on the
sustainability of the optimal demand deposit scheme. More speci￿cally, our analysis dif-
ferentiates between two benchmark scenarios with respect to the scheme-participants￿
article is foremostly interested in the possibility of bank runs due to the existence of a ￿ bad￿demand
deposit equilibrium. While the￿ non-trivial￿ question about the possible emergence of strategic bank
runs is beyond the scope of the present paper, the interested reader is referred to Postlewaite and Vives
(1987), Rochet and Vives (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Zimper (2006) and the literature cited
therein.
2I am grateful to J￿rgen Eichberger for pointing out to me that positive welfare e⁄ects from ￿nancial
intermeditation may be due to relaxed budget constraints in the aggregate and therefore also apply to
a risk-neutral environment; (cf. Remark 1 in Section 2).
3future income:
￿ If the agents receive a high future income￿ beyond the contracted income of the de-
mand deposit scheme￿ a high expected asset-price is plausible because a prospec-
tive renegade agent will face a large number of prospective buyers (i.e., all scheme-
participants with a low desire for liquidity) who might engage in a ￿erce Bertrand
price competition for his asset.
￿ If, in contrast, the agents receive a low future income, any subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium involves￿ on the demand side of the ex-post asset market￿ only low
type scheme-participants who have misreported their type in order to obtain liquid-
ity through the demand deposit scheme. Under suitable model-parameter values￿
e.g., a large proportion of agents with a high desire for liquidity; a strong desire
for liquidity by such agents; a low return on the investment project￿ there will be
only one prospective buyer in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to the e⁄ect that
a rather low expected asset-price obtains in the ex-post asset market now modeled
as a bilateral bargaining situation (Proposition 5).
Our formal ￿ndings suggest that the original formulation of the ￿ Jacklin critique￿is
too general and that its validness strongly depends on the future income situation of
the considered population as well as on the (expected) return of the investment project.
Simply speaking, the ￿ Jacklin critique￿appears to be foremostly valid for populations of
people who receive high future income which gives them￿ beyond the demand deposit
scheme￿ su¢ cient liquidity to purchase the asset at a high price in some ex-post asset
market. In contrast, the ￿ Jacklin critique￿does not necessarily apply to a population
of people with low future income who can only use the liquidity resources provided
through the demand deposit scheme in case they want to purchase the asset on the
ex-post market. For such low future income population there is no strong incentive to
become a renegade agent because the expected price on the ex-post market tends to
be rather low. Normatively interpreted our ￿ndings thus establish that a sustainable
demand deposit scheme can be welfare maximizing for (i) people who cannot expect
high income levels in the near future combined with (ii) a low (expected) return of the
investment project. Positively interpreted our ￿ndings suggest that (i) the participants
in existing demand deposit schemes would be pensioners or long-time students rather
than, say, investment bankers or CEOs whereby (ii) such schemes would be rather used
to ￿nance projects with low (expected) returns.
The remainder of our analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model and characterizes the autarkic as well as the ￿rst best liquidity allocation under the
4assumption of risk-neutral agents. In Section 3 we derive the second best allocation and
show how it can be implemented through a demand deposit scheme. Section 4 describes
the situation of a prospective renegade agent and characterizes the sustainability of the
optimal demand deposit scheme in terms of the asset-price obtainable in the ex-post
asset market. The high future income scenario is investigated in Section 5 whereby we
argue that the ￿ Jacklin critique￿is most plausible for this scenario. In contrast, Section 6
considers the low future income scenario for which sustainability of the optimal demand
deposit scheme obtains for suitable values of the model-parameters. Finally, Section 7
concludes with a discussion of the related literature.
2 The basic set-up
Our agents live in a three-period world in which they receive exogenous income I0 =
1 and I1 ￿ 0 in periods 0 and 1, respectively. We thereby interpret I0 and I1 as
￿ additional￿income; that is, this income is freely disposable for investment purposes on
top of whatever income the agent has spent on his every-day consumption. We will at
￿rst focus on welfare-optimal allocations whereby we are exclusively interested in the
agents￿investment decisions subject to the budget constraint as given by the period
0 income I0. Only when we check in subsequent sections for the sustainability of the
optimal demand deposit scheme, the period 1 (=￿future￿ ) income I1 becomes relevant
because it enters into the budget constraint for the ex-post asset market situation.
More speci￿cally, we consider at ￿rst an autarkic investment situation in which a
time-patient, risk-neutral agent decides in period 0 how much of his period 0 income I0
he will hold as money, M, or invest in assets, A, that give him the right to the proceeds
of a long-term project. In period 1, the agent learns whether his immediate desire for
liquidity, i.e., money, is either high or low. The project pays out its proceeds in period
2 whereby the (expected) return is given as R. Denote by ￿ (H) 2 (0;1), respectively
￿ (L) = 1 ￿ ￿ (H), the probability that the agent has high, respectively, low desire for
liquidity. Formally, the agent maximizes the following expected utility function
EU (M;A) = ￿H ￿ M ￿ ￿ (H) + ￿L ￿ M ￿ ￿ (L) + R ￿ A + c (1)
subject to the budget constraint
I0 = M + A = 1. (2)
The constant c thereby denotes the expected utility from period 1 income I1 and is
de￿ned as
c ￿ [￿H ￿ ￿ (H) + ￿L ￿ ￿ (L)] ￿ I1.
5The utility weights ￿H and ￿L measure the liquidity desire of the high, respectively, low
type whereby we impose the following assumption on the parameter values:
Assumption. It holds for the model parameters that
1 < ￿L < R < ￿H. (3)
A possible interpretation of the above scenario would be that the agent learns in
period 1 about a short-term investment opportunity which either gives him a low, ￿L,
or a high, ￿H, instantaneous return on every unit of money he invests in period 1. Since
the long-term investment project is, by assumption, illiquid in the sense that there is
no way of turning these assets into money before period 2, the agent of this autarkic
situation will hold all his period 0 income as money whenever
￿ (L) ￿ ￿L + ￿ (H) ￿ ￿H > R (4)




￿ = 0) = ￿H ￿ M ￿ ￿ (H) + ￿L ￿ M + c. (5)





￿ = 1) = R + c. (6)
In this autarkic investment situation assets as well as money could only be simultaneously
held in equilibrium when the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. in (4) coincide so that the agent is
indi⁄erent between holding money and investing in assets.
Consider now a situation with a large population of ex-ante identical agents. More
speci￿cally, we associate agents with the points in the unit interval whereby we assume
that the law of large numbers applies to the e⁄ect that in period 1 a mass ￿ = ￿ (H) of
agents will have a high desire and a mass 1 ￿ ￿ = ￿ (L) of agents will have a low desire
for liquidity.3 If all agents pool in period 0 their initial wealth with a welfare maximizing
3That the individual probability of an agent to turn out as a high type coincides (almost surely) with
the fraction of high types in the population, is for a countably in￿nite population justi￿ed by the law of
large numbers together with the assumption that agents￿types are i.i.d. While such justi￿cation is￿ for
measure-theoretic reasons (cf, e.g., Judd 1982, Du¢ e and Sun 2007)￿ not at hand for the continuous
population of our model, we simply follow here the literature and misquote the law of large numbers in
the ￿ usual way￿ .
6￿nancial intermediary who can observe each agent￿ s true type, this intermediary would
maximize
EU
1st (A(H);A(L);M (L);M (H)) (7)
= (￿H ￿ M (H) + R ￿ A(H)) ￿ ￿ + (￿L ￿ M (L) + R ￿ A(L)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + c
subject to the budget constraint
￿ ￿ (A(H) + M (H)) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (A(L) + M (L)) = 1
where M (t), respectively A(t), denotes the amount of money, respectively assets, that
is allocated in period 1 to each agent of type t 2 fH;Lg. The following solution to this
maximization problem follows easily from assumption (3).
Proposition 1: If liquidity types are observable by the ￿nancial intermediary, the ￿rst
best allocation is given by
A
￿ (H) = A
￿ (L) = M












￿ (H)) = ￿H + c. (10)
Observe that, by assumption (3), EU1st > EUAut. A ￿nancial intermediary could
thus strictly improve the ex-ante expected utility of a large population of risk-neutral
agents by exploiting the budget constraints under the assumption that he can observe
the agents￿true types. In what follows we consider the￿ more realistic￿ case that the
agents￿liquidity types are private information rather than observable by the ￿nancial
intermediary.
Remark 1. The standard approaches of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) consider (strongly) risk-averse agents whereby welfare-maximizing allocations
implemented by ￿nancial intermediation are motivated as optimal ￿risk-sharing￿ al-
locations that provide ￿liquidity insurance￿ . In contrast, Proposition 1 shows that a
￿nancial intermediary can strictly improve welfare in terms of agents￿ex ante expected
7utility even in a risk-neutral environment for which insurance considerations do not mat-
ter.4 A similar, i.e., risk-neutral, model as our basic set-up is published in Chapter 7
of Eichberger and Harper (1997) and appeared￿ to the best of my knowledge￿ at ￿rst
in the unpublished working papers by Eichberger and Milne (1991) and by Eichberger
(1992).
Remark 2. At a ￿rst glance it might be surprising why the law of large num-
bers enters into a welfare-maximization argument about risk-neutral agents. To see
the economic rationale behind Proposition 1 consider the simple situation of only two
risk-neutral agents who will each earn in period 2 a pro￿t of 1. Further assume that
exactly one of these agents will die before consuming the pro￿t in period 2 (i.e., ￿L = 0)
whereby each agent￿ s probability of premature death is ￿ (L) = 0:5. Clearly, both agents
can maximize their respective ex-ante expected utility through a contract according to
which the survivor gets the non-surviving agent￿ s period 2 pro￿t on top of his own pro￿t.
The resulting ex-ante expected utility from such arrangement is given as EU = ￿H￿0:5￿2
instead of only EU = ￿H￿0:5￿1 obtainable in the autarkic situation. A similar argument
gives rise to the optimal allocation (8)-(9) whereby the law of large numbers ensures that
the number of ￿non-surviving agents￿ , and thereby their monetary resources which can
be allocated to the ￿survivors￿ , is pinned down with certainty in the intermediary￿ s
budget constraint.
3 Implementation of the second best allocation through
a demand deposit scheme
The ￿rst best allocation (8)-(10) is no longer implementable whenever the agents￿liq-
uidity desire is private information since agents with a low desire for liquidity would
pretend to be of a high rather than a low type. In order to identify the second best
allocation it is, by the revelation principle, su¢ cient to consider a direct mechanism
where every agent truthfully reveals his type. Suppose now that every agent reports to
a ￿nancial intermediary some type # 2 fh;lg where h stands for reporting a high and
l for reporting a low type. The following incentive compatibility conditions for high,
respectively low, types are then relevant to our model:
4As one referee correctly points out: While the very speci￿c preference-structure of the Diamond-
Dybvig model even allows for an implementation of the ￿rst-best allocation under asymmetric in-
formation, maximization under asymmetric information can in our model￿ in line with the standard
literature￿ only achieve a second best allocation.
8IC(H):
R ￿ A(h) + ￿H ￿ M (h) (11)
￿ R ￿ A(l) + ￿H ￿ M (l)
IC(L):
R ￿ A(l) + ￿L ￿ M (l) (12)
￿ R ￿ A(h) + ￿L ￿ M (h)
Provided that these incentive compatibility conditions hold, a welfare maximizing
￿nancial intermediary maximizes
EU
2nd (A(h);A(l);M (l);M (h)) (13)
= (￿H ￿ M (h) + R ￿ A(h)) ￿ ￿ + (￿L ￿ M (l) + R ￿ A(l)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + c
subject to the budget constraint
￿ ￿ (A(h) + M (h)) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (A(l) + M (l)) = 1.
M (#), respectively A(#), denote here the amount of money, respectively assets, that is
allocated in period 1 to each agent who reports type # 2 fh;lg. By assumption (3), any
optimum requires A￿ (h) = M￿ (l) = 0. Furthermore, IC(L) must be binding, i.e., hold
with equality, since in an optimum M (h) will be chosen as great as possible without
violating incentive compatibility conditions. In an optimum, we therefore have
R ￿ A(l) = ￿L ￿ M (h) (14)
implying, by the budget constraints,
M (h) =
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ A(l)
￿
. (15)
Substitution then yields for the optimal amounts of money, respectively assets, allocated
to the high, respectively, low types
R ￿ A










￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
.
The following proposition collects the above results.
9Proposition 2: If liquidity types are not observable by the ￿nancial intermediary, the
second best allocation is given by
A
￿ (h) = M









￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
: (18)








￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
￿ R +
R ￿ ￿
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
￿ ￿H + c.
Observe that EUaut < EU2nd < EU1st. Thus, while the second best allocation
does not achieve the ex-ante expected utility of the ￿rst best allocation it is still a
strict improvement over the autarkic investment situation. Furthermore, observe that
a standard demand deposit contract of a bank￿ which guarantees real interest rates
r1;r2 ￿ 0 for the agents￿deposits in periods 1 and 2￿ may result in this second best
allocation. In particular, the following interest rates
1 + r1 =
R
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
(20)
1 + r2 = ￿L (21)
would then give rise to a demand deposit scheme that generates the second best alloca-
tion of Proposition 2 whereby (21) follows from (20) together with
(1 + r1) ￿ (1 + r2) =
￿L
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
￿ R. (22)
4 Introducing the possibility of becoming a rene-
gade agent
While the second best allocation of Proposition 2 is, by construction, incentive compat-
ible, it is not clear in how far it is sustainable when alternative actions become available
to the agents in period 0. In this section, we will investigate whether the optimal demand
deposit scheme (16)-(18) is implementable in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under
the relaxed participation constraint that any agent can alternatively make in period 0
10a private investment whereby he has in period 1 full access to an ex-post asset mar-
ket. Provided that all other agents participate in the demand deposit scheme (16)-(18),
such a renegade agent could then sell his asset on the ex-post asset market to scheme-
participating agents as prospective buyers. In this section we formally characterize the
period 0 decision situation of an agent of either becoming a renegade agent or not.
Let us suppose￿ somewhat informally￿ that there are relevant subgame asset mar-
kets in period 1 at which a renegade agent manages to sell the assets of his private
long-term investment project which entitle to payo⁄ R in period 2.5 At ￿rst observe
that there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium in which a renegade agent with low liquid-
ity desire could do better by selling rather than keeping his assets. As a consequence,
any renegade agent who sells his assets in such a subgame must have a high desire for
liquidity. More speci￿cally, suppose that the subgame results in some equilibrium price
p￿. From his ex-ante perspective, an agent will then have a strict incentive for not par-









￿) = R ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + p
￿ ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿ + c. (24)
EUren (p￿) stands here for the renegade agent￿ s ex-ante expected utility that obtains
whenever he sells his assets in the asset market at equilibrium price p￿. Given these
preliminary observations we are now able to characterize the sustainability of the demand
deposit scheme in terms of the equilibrium price p￿ that obtains in the ex-post market.
Proposition 3: De￿ne the following threshold level
t
￿ ￿
￿H ￿ R + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿





1. No agent has a strict incentive to become a renegade and deviate from the de-
mand deposit scheme (16)-(18) if he can only sell his assets at an equilibrium
price p￿ in the subgame market situation such that p￿ ￿ t￿.
2. Conversely, if there is some agent who can sell his assets at an equilibrium
price p￿ such that p￿ > t￿, then this agent has a strict incentive to become a
renegade agent.
5Without loss of generality, we can neglect subgames in which the renegade agent does not trade
assets since they do not give rise to a higher expected utility than the autarcic investment situation.







￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
￿ R ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) +
R
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
￿ ￿H ￿ ￿ (27)
￿ R ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + p
￿ ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿
whereby this inequality is mathematically equivalent to
￿H ￿ R + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿






This proves Proposition 3.￿
Proposition 3 is an important intermediate result of our paper because it demon-
strates that sustainability of the second best liquidity allocation through a demand
deposit scheme exclusively depends on the price obtainable in the ex-post asset market.
Whether the equilibrium price p￿ is below or above the critical threshold value (25)
depends thereby on the way we model such ex-post asset market. In the following two
sections we investigate two di⁄erent scenarios which both endogenize such ex-post asset
market within our model set-up whereby the determination of p￿ strongly depends on
whether the future income I1 is either high or low.
5 Sustainability of the second best allocation in the
case of high future income
In the previous section we have determined that an agent has an incentive to become a
renegade agent in period 0, if he can expect in period 1 a price for his asset that is above
the threshold value (25). Let us now jump to this ex-post asset market situation in order
to investigate which equilibrium price p￿ may plausibly emerge. We thereby make in
this section the crucial assumption that the potential buyers for this asset do not face
any relevant budget constraints with respect to their period 1 liquidity. More precisely,
we assume throughout this section that the agents￿period 1 income is su¢ ciently large




Recall from the previous section that any prospective seller of an asset has to be
a renegade agent with a high desire for liquidity. Conversely, only agents with a low
12desire for liquidity would buy in any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium the asset from
the renegade agent. Intuitively, high type agents are happy with the amount of money
allocated to them by the ￿nancial intermediary whereas low type agents are ￿exploited￿
by their binding incentive compatibility condition. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the
renegade agent cannot make any attractive o⁄er to high type agents at which he himself
would be willing to sell his asset. As a consequence, the only relevant trading partners
we have to consider are a high-type renegade agent and low-type scheme-participants.






so that his reservation price is given as R
￿H. When a low-type scheme-participating agent




￿ (l) ￿ R + (I1 ￿ p
￿) ￿ ￿L + R (31)
whenever his period 1 income is su¢ ciently high, i.e., whenever I1 ￿ p￿. If, instead, this
agent does not purchase the asset, he settles for utility
EU
low = A
￿ (l) ￿ R + I1 ￿ ￿L. (32)
As a consequence, the low type scheme-participating agent with su¢ ciently high income











The prospective buyer￿ s maximal willingness-to-pay is therefore R
￿L whereby assumption
(29) formally ensures that any buyer can actually a⁄ord the asset at such high price.












whereby p￿ = R
￿L stands for the case where the seller (i.e., the high type renegade agent)
has full market power whereas p￿ = R
￿H describes the opposite situation where the buyer
(i.e., a low type scheme-participating agent) has full market power. In order to further




￿ = ￿ ￿
R
￿L
+ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
R
￿H
, ￿ 2 [0;1] (36)
13where the parameter ￿ is a measure for the renegade agent￿ s market-power on the ex-post
asset market.













1. An agent has a strict incentive to become a renegade and deviate from the
demand deposit scheme (16)-(18) if and only if his market-power is su¢ ciently
high in the sense that we have for the market-power parameter ￿ > ￿￿.
2. If a prospective renegade agent will have full market-power, i.e., ￿ = 1, then
he has a strict incentive to become a renegade agent.
3. Conversely, if a prospective renegade agent will have no market-power at all,
i.e., ￿ = 0, then he has no incentive to become a renegade agent.












￿H ￿ R + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
















This proves statement 1. Finally, observe that
￿
￿ 2 (0;1) (41)
since, by our assumption 1 < ￿L < R < ￿H,
￿
￿L








This proves statements 2 and 3.￿
Proposition 4 links the sustainability of a second best allocation through a demand
deposit scheme to a prospective renegade agent￿ s market power on the ex-post asset mar-
ket. On the one hand, Proposition 4 can therefore be read as a relevant quali￿cation of
14the ￿ Jacklin critique￿ . Namely, whereas Jacklin claims that the mere possibility of an ex-
post asset market implies the unsustainability of the second best allocation, Proposition
4 establishes that the question of sustainability rather depends on the renegade agent￿ s
market power on the ex-post asset market. If this market power is su¢ ciently low, i.e.,
if ￿ is below the threshold value (37), then a demand deposit scheme can sustainably
implement the second best allocation.
Example. One possible way to endogenize the notion of ￿ market power￿is to de-
scribe the ex-post asset market as a bilateral bargaining situation between the asset￿ s
prospective seller and buyer. Consider, for example, an ultimatum bargaining situation
such that ￿ stands for the probability that the seller will be in the position of making
a take-it-or-leave-it (=TOL) o⁄er whereas (1 ￿ a) stands for the probability that the
buyer will make such TOL o⁄er. Since the seller would ask for price R
￿L and the buyer
would o⁄er price R
￿H, the expected equilibrium price coincides with p￿
￿. According to this
interpretation of the parameter ￿, the renegade agent￿ s market-power is thus described
by his bargaining power in terms of the probability that he will be able to make an
TOL o⁄er. Without going into the technical details of bargaining theory, observe that
alternative interpretations of the parameter ￿ in the pricing formula (36) can be derived
from Rubinstein￿ s (1982) in￿nite horizon alternating bargaining situation in terms of
the agents￿time-discount factors as well as from the Nash bargaining solution (Nash
1950) in terms of the agents￿bargaining power parameters; (also cf., e.g., Kultti 2000,
Demougin and Helm 2006).
On the other hand, however, Proposition 4 can also be read as a re-con￿rmation of
Jacklin￿ s critique. Namely, under our assumption of a high period 1 income, the potential
demand-side for the renegade￿ s asset is given by the whole population of low type agents,
which is large by assumption. Rather than facing a bilateral bargaining situation, the
prospective seller would thus face a large number of potential buyers with high liquidity
resources. Standard argumentation from Bertrand price competition would then suggest
that these potential buyers engage in a ￿erce bidding competition to the e⁄ect that the
renegade agent has full market power, i.e., ￿ = 1, and sells the asset at the high price
p￿ = R
￿L.
To sum up: While Proposition 4 shows that not the possible existence of an ex-
post asset market per sØ but rather the renegade agent￿ s market power may destroy the
sustainability of a welfare-maximizing demand deposit scheme, it seems plausible that
a renegade agent will have a high market power under the assumption that agents have
a su¢ ciently high period 1 income. That is, the Jacklin critique appears to be a valid
15argument against the sustainability of a welfare-maximizing demand deposit scheme
whenever the low type agents￿period 1 income provides them with enough liquidity to
purchase the asset at a high price.
6 Sustainability of the second best allocation in the
case of low future income
Because of the assumption of a high future income, i.e.., I1 > R
￿L, the previous section￿ s
potential demand-side for the asset on some ex-post market was given by all low-type
agents who could, by assumption, a⁄ord to pay a price up to R
￿L. In this section we
consider the situation of low future income whereby we focus on the interesting bench-
mark case where I1 = 0. Under the assumption of low future income, only agents who
receive liquidity through the demand deposit scheme by reporting a high type are able
to buy the asset on some ex-post market in period 1. While a low type agent￿ s maximal
willingness-to-pay is still R
￿L, he can now￿ in contrast to the high income scenario￿ only
a⁄ord to buy up to a price that equals the liquidity which he obtains by misreporting







Assumption. If there is more than one prospective buyer in the ex-post asset market,
i.e., n > 1, then these prospective buyers engage in a Bertrand price competition





￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
(44)
to a randomly selected buyer.
Suppose that n > 1 low-type agents misreport their type in order to compete with
liquidity M￿ (h) on the demand-side of the ex-post asset market. By the above Bertrand







￿ (h) ￿ p





16whereby we assume that each prospective buyer has an equal chance of 1
n to buy the




￿ (l)) = A
￿ (l) ￿ R (47)
=
￿L
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
￿ R. (48)
The following observation establishes that a su¢ ciently large di⁄erence between the
parameter-values ￿L and R may give more than one low type agent a strict incentive
to misreport his type in a Nash equilibrium to the e⁄ect that the renegade agent can
secure himself the maximal price (44) on the ex-post asset market.
Observation: Suppose that we have for the model parameters ￿L;R;￿ that
￿L





Then the demand deposit scheme is not sustainable for low future income.
Proof. As a consequence of the Bertrand price competition assumption for the ex-
post market subgame, the scheme-participating low types￿decision whether to misreport
their type or not amounts to a coordination game. The equilibrium number n￿ of
prospective buyers￿ i.e., low type agents who misreport their type in order to be able
to trade on the ex-post asset market￿ in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this











￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
, (51)
whenever n > 1. Thus, if (49) is satis￿ed, we have that n￿ > 1 so that the renegade
agent would sell the asset, by the Bertrand price competition assumption, at price (44).
To see that this ex-post market equilibrium price would give a strict ex-ante incentive
for becoming a renegade observe that
6We consider strict inequality because we stipulate for the case of indi⁄erence that the scheme-






￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
>
￿H ￿ R + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿





R > ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿, (54)
which is always satis￿ed. Under condition (49), an agent will have a strict ex-ante
incentive to become a renegade agent in order to sell his asset on the ex-post asset market
to low-type scheme-participants who have themselves a strict incentive to misreport their
type in order to compete with each other on the ex-post asset market.￿
If condition (49) is not satis￿ed, the picture is di⁄erent. Namely, if
￿L





there will be exactly one prospective buyer in the ex-post market in any Nash equilibrium
of the above coordination game. Instead of a Bertrand price competition between several
prospective buyers￿ thereby giving full market power to the renegade agent￿ it is most
plausible to endogenize this ex-post market situation as a bilateral bargaining situation
between a high type renegade agent, on the one hand, and a low type agent who has
misreported his type, on the other hand. To this end consider an ultimatum bargaining
situation in which the renegade agent, (resp. the low type agent), makes an TOL o⁄er
with probability ￿, (resp. 1 ￿ ￿). The corresponding expected equilibrium price on the
ex-post asset market is now given as
p
￿￿
￿ = ￿ ￿
R
￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
R
￿H
with ￿ 2 [0;1]. (56)
In order to focus the subsequent analysis, we consider the￿ plausible￿ symmetric case
in which both agents have an ex-ante equal chance to make an TOL.
Assumption. We suppose that both agents have identical bargaining power, i.e., ￿ =







￿H + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿





18The following proposition characterizes￿ under the assumption of identical bargain-
ing power￿ the sustainability of the welfare-maximizing demand deposit scheme in terms
of the model￿ s parameter-values ￿L;R;￿H, and ￿.
Proposition 5: Recall our parameter convention 1 < ￿L < R < ￿H and assume that7
￿L





1. Fix the parameter values ￿L;R;￿H. Then the demand deposit scheme (16)-
(18) is sustainable if ￿ is su¢ ciently large. In particular, ￿ has to satisfy
￿ ￿
2R ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿L
R ￿ ￿L
, (59)
which is always the case if ￿ is su¢ ciently close to one or if R ￿ 1
2 (￿H + ￿L).
2. Fix the parameter values ￿L;R;￿. Then the demand deposit scheme (16)-(18)
is sustainable if ￿H is su¢ ciently large, i.e., if ￿H satis￿es
￿H ￿ R ￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). (60)
3. Fix the parameter values ￿L;￿H;￿. Then the demand deposit scheme (16)-
(18) is sustainable if R is su¢ ciently small, i.e., if R is su¢ ciently close to
￿L.
4. Analogously, ￿x the parameter values R;￿H;￿. Then the demand deposit
scheme (16)-(18) is sustainable if ￿L is su¢ ciently small, i.e., if ￿L is suf-
￿ciently close to 1.
Proof: No agent has a strict incentive to become a renegade and deviate from the









￿H + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿






￿H ￿ R + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ ￿





7Observe that inequality (58) holds for all values of ￿ if R ￿ 2 ￿ ￿L.
19which is mathematically equivalent to
R ￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿H + ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). (63)
The results of Proposition 5 follow easily from an rearrangement of (63) in combination
with taking the appropriate limits.￿
Proposition 5 demonstrates the rather complicated quantitative relationship between
the values of our model parameters ￿L;R;￿H, and ￿, on the one hand, and the question
of whether a demand deposit scheme is sustainable when there exists equal bargaining
power in an ex-post asset market described as bilateral bargaining situation, on the other
hand. However, as qualitative main insight from Proposition 5 we can conclude:
￿ Under the assumption that the scheme-participants have a low future income, the
welfare-maximizing demand deposit scheme (16)-(18) is sustainable whenever the
marginal return of the long-term investment, R, is rather low compared to the low
type￿ s marginal utility from period 1 liquidity, ￿L.
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
In the light of the ￿ Jacklin critique￿ , Hellwig (1994) poignantly asks: ￿Why are ￿nancial
intermediaries actually needed?￿(p. 1382) and goes on to o⁄er three possible answers:
avoidance of market-transaction costs, a role as commitment device, and the monitoring-
cost advantage argument by Diamond (1984), see also Hellwig (1998). An alternative
rationale for the existence of ￿nancial intermediaries￿ related to the transaction cost
argument￿ is given by Wallace (1988) who argues that an implementation of the second
best allocation by a demand deposit scheme is only sustainable when the agents remain
isolated from each other in any ex-post situation. Or, positively interpreted: According
to Wallace demand deposits exist in circumstances where agents cannot communicate
with each other so that the existence of ex-post markets becomes impossible. Finally,
Diamond (1997) argues that the assumption of ex-post markets in the sense of Jacklin
(1987) but only with limited participation may give rise to a sustainable banking sector.
The present paper￿ s argument on possible merits of ￿nancial intermediation di⁄ers
from the above answers. According to our model a demand deposit scheme can sustain-
ably implement an optimal liquidity allocation whenever prospective renegade agents
have a su¢ ciently low market power on the ex-post asset market. Furthermore, we ar-
gue that the renegade agent￿ s market power would be rather low whenever the demand
20deposit scheme participants have a low future income. That is, while the ￿ Jacklin cri-
tique￿appears to be a valid argument for a high future income population it does not
necessarily apply to low future income populations.
The key to our formal ￿ndings is a game-theoretically sound description of the ex-
post asset market situation that may arise when a renegade agent does not participate
in the demand deposit scheme. Jacklin￿ s original analysis is unsatisfactory in this regard
because the origin, and therefore the structure, of such ex-post market situations remain
rather unclear except for the claim that this market will be competitive, i.e., renegade
agents are price-takers, too. This shortcoming of Jacklin￿ s formal argument had been
observed earlier by von Thadden (1999) who writes:
￿[:::] the ￿ Jacklin critique￿[:::], however, was less convincing as it stood,
because it considered individual deviations from the banking contract at date
0, without modelling trading at date 1 (if every agent but one invests in the
bank, there is no market!).￿(footnote 7)
Von Thadden (1999) proceeds by formally introducing ex-post asset markets into
Jacklin￿ s model whereby the existence of such markets is exogenously guaranteed by the
assumption that every agent must privately invest some positive fraction of his wealth
in the investment project. However, since the incentives for private investments are not
endogenously derived from the model but rather stated as an ad-hoc assumption, von
Thadden￿ s approach is also not fully convincing. In contrast, our approach considers
ex-post market subgames in which a renegade agent can trade an asset with agents that
actually participate in the bank￿ s demand deposit scheme whereby we have chosen to
model such ex-post asset markets in terms of Bertrand price competition and bilateral
bargaining situations, respectively. As a consequence, such ex-post markets are not
necessarily fully competitive but rather the market power of market participants has an
impact on equilibrium prices whereby the budget constraint in terms of future income
plays a crucial role when we determine the equilibrium price. Thus, while we agree with
the ￿rst part of von Thadden￿ s observation about inconsistencies in Jacklin￿ s original
analysis, we disagree with his claim that ￿[:::] if every agent but one invests in the bank,
there is no market! [:::]￿ . It is exactly the careful game-theoretic formalization of such
possible ex-post market situations in which one renegade agent may sell his asset to
scheme-participants that drives our formal ￿ndings.
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